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WHEN IS A CPA AS IMPORTANT AS YOUR
ERA? A COMPREHENSIVE EVALUATION
AND EXAMINATION OF STATE TAX ISSUES
ON PROFESSIONAL ATHLETES
ALAN POGROSZEWSKI*
Although Article I, Section 8 of the United States Constitution establishes
the dual sovereignty of the states and the federal government, ' states in the
past rarely taxed nonresidents on personal income. This all changed as
increased fiscal pressures faced by many state and local governments at the
end of the last century led to increased enforcement against athletes of
nonresident tax laws that in most instances have been on the books for many
2
years.
Nonresident taxation on professional athletes gained national attention in
the early 1990s. Philadelphia began enforcing its city tax on nonresidents,
specifically athletes, while Illinois retaliated against California's nonresident
tax on Michael Jordan and his Chicago Bulls teammates following their 1991
National Basketball Association (NBA) Championship against the Los
Angeles Lakers. Despite the publicity received from both Philadelphia's and
Illinois's implementation of a nonresident tax, state court cases have shown
that California had been taxing nonresident athletes as early as 1968, while
New York has been doing so since 1971.3

Professional athletes make an attractive target for state tax collectors
because of their high salaries. For example, Major League Baseball (MLB)
average player's salary has increased from $512,804 in 1989 to $3,154,845
this year. 4 This increased revenue, as well as the fact that athletes are easy to
identify by the simple use of a box score and schedule has caused the
increased enforcement by states against athletes of nonresident tax. 5
Alan Pogroszewski NEED INFO.
1. U.S. CONST. art. 1,§ 8.
2. See generally James W. Wetzler, Chair, State Income Taxation of Nonresident Professional
Team Athletes: A Uniform Approach, J. FED'N OF TAX ADMIN., Mar. 1994.
3. See In re Partee, 1976 Cal. Tax LEXIS 35 (Equal'n 1976); In re White, 1980 N.Y. Tax LEXIS
535 (Tax Comm'n 1979).

4. MLB Salaries, http://www.sportsline.com/mlb/salaries/avgsalaries (last visited Apr. 11, 2009).
5. Robert D. Platter, FTA Recommendations on Taxing Nonresident Athletes Could Have Wider
Application, J. MULTISTATE TAX'N & INCENTIVES 36, 36 - 40 (Mar./Apr. 1994).
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With nearly 3,500 professional athletes playing in the four major league
sports leagues and participating in twenty states that have individual state
income tax, athletes and their advisors need to be informed on how state
taxation affects them. Knowledge of how resident and nonresident state tax
affects these athletes and the education to protect them from being over taxed
is just as important in the current market place as securing their next big
contract.
This article will begin with a historical look at the states' ability to tax
both their resident and those nonresidents who earn income within their
borders by reviewing the Supreme Court's interpretation whether this is within
the state's constitutional power. This will be followed by an examination on
how individual states came to determine the apportionment of income of a
nonresident. This section reviews the individual state court decisions that
define the tax implications to off season training, spring training the post
season, and the allocation of athletes playing and signing bonus for a
nonresident athlete. The article then examines the practical application of this
tax in whether or not states increase their overall income tax revenue by this
practice. Research in this section indicates that they in fact do. The article
then concludes with the practical consequences on how these laws affect
individual athletes. This Article concludes with the fact that there may be at
least one reason why you may want to sign a free agent client with the Tampa
Bay Rays rather than with the San Diego Padres.
I. HISTORICAL BACKGROUND

How did we get to this complexity of state taxation of professional
athletes? Even though Congress possesses the "constitutional power and
legislative resources adequate to cope with major conflicts, it refrained for the
most part from taking the requisite action." 6 With the void caused by
Congress' nonaction, nonresident taxation policies, specifically those for
professional athletes, have been interpreted and developed by the United
States Supreme Court and state court rulings, state law, other states policies,
and the recommendations of conformity by the Federation of Tax
Administrators [FTA].
There*are two issues that specifically effect professional athletes in the
area of state taxation on personal income. The first is the ability of states to
tax nonresidents on income earned in their state. The second is the states'
constitutional power to tax residents on all of their personal income from

6. Jerome Hellerstein & Edmund Hennefeld, State Taxation in a NationalEconomy, 54 HARV. L.
REv 949, 949 1941.
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whatever source derived.
The first issue was addressed by the Supreme Court in their ruling in
Shaffer v. Carter.7 Shaffer, a taxpayer of Illinois and resident of Chicago,
believed his $1.5 million income earned in Oklahoma during 1915 and 1916
should not be subjected to personal income tax because he was a nonresident. 8
Shaffer argued that the $76,000 tax subjected by the state of Oklahoma
violated, amongst other things, his constitutional rights of guaranteeing
privileges and immunities and the Equal Protection Clause as outlined under
the Fourteenth Amendment by discriminating against nonresidents by
depriving them the ability to deduct losses incurred outside of Oklahoma while
9
citizens and residents of the state could do so.
On March 1, 1920 the court ruled in favor of the state and upheld the tax
on Shaffer, stating that a state "may impose general income taxes upon its own
citizens and residents whose persons are subject to its control." 10 Most
importantly, the court went on to say that a state may "levy a duty of like
character, and not more onerous in its effect, upon incomes accruing to nonresidents from their property or business within the State, or their occupations
11
carried on therein.""
The second issue, whether a state is able to tax a resident's income no
matter where it is derived, was first addressed by the Supreme Court in Cohn
v. Graves. 12 Cohn, a resident of New York and a land owner in New Jersey,
argued that New York's attempt to tax her New Jersey rental income violated
both her equal protection and due process rights, due to the fact that the
income was derived from sources that are located outside of the state. 13
On March 1, 1937 the Supreme Court upheld the tax on Cohn stating,
"that the receipt of income by a resident of the territory of a taxing sovereignty
is a taxable event is universally recognized. Domicil[e] itself affords a basis
for such taxation. Enjoyment of the privileges of residence in the state and the
attendant right to invoke the protection of its laws are inseparable from
responsibility for sharing the costs of government."' 14 The Court then stated
that, "taxes are what we pay for civilized society."' 5

7. 252 U.S. 37, 45 (1920).
8. Id. at 46.
9. Id.
10. Id.at 52.
11. Id.
12. 300 U.S. 308,(1937).
13.

Id.at 312.

14. Id.at 312-13.
15. Id. at 313 (quoting Holmes dissent in Compania General de Tabacos v. Collector, 275 U.S.

MARQUETTE SPORTS LA W REVIEW

[Vol. 19:2

II. FORMULATION OF EARLY STATE TAX POLICIES
With the taxation of nonresidents having been found to be constitutional
by the Supreme Court of the United States, this has left states to determine the
apportionment of this income earned inside and outside the state. The three
issues specifically effecting nonresident athlete taxation were first addressed
by the state courts of California, New York and to a lesser extent Wisconsin.
First, how is a nonresident's compensation to be apportioned within and
outside the state? Second, what constitutes a season for a professional athlete
and what should be included in the apportionment formula? Third, what
constitutes compensation, specifically the apportionment of signing bonuses to
a nonresident state?
How Is Income Apportioned?
In order to determine how to apportion income to multiple states, the
courts have addressed the merits of both the duty-day and game day formulas.
The game day formula only takes into consideration the number of games
participated in a given state as a percentage of total games in the season. The
duty-day or working day formula takes the total number of days that an athlete
performs services, such as a game, practice or participation in a team meeting
for his team in a particular state as a percentage of total days in the season. 16
Determining non-resident apportionment of income was first addressed in
In re Partee.17 The case involved San Diego Charger's punter and place
kicker Dan Partee, a Texas resident, earning income in the state of California
during the 1968 AFL season.
Partee, a nonresident of California, claimed that his California income
should be apportioned by the games played in and out of the state. With a
fourteen game schedule and only eight games played in state, Partee argued
that fifty-seven percent of his entire personal income should be subjected to
taxation in California. 18 California in turn, used the working day or duty-day
approach calculating a much greater apportionment figure of seventy-six
percent that reflected the seventy-four out of ninety-eight days that Partee
worked in the state of California. 19
On October 6, 1976, the California Board of Equalization ruled in favor of
the state's 'working day' apportionment formula as opposed to Partee's 'game
87, 100 (1927).
16. Id.
17. In rePartee,1976 Cal. Tax LEXiS at 35.
18. Id. at 4.
19. Id.
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day' approach. 20 The court justified their ruling with the wording in Partee's
contract that "required each player to participate in practice sessions" thus
paid for practices and
concluding, "that professional football players 2are
1
necessary travel, as well as for playing in games."
In In re Partee, the court also addressed the issue of a fair and justifiable
measure in determining an athlete's allocation to a state. The court stated that
although the "working-day" formula worked in football, other sports such as
baseball, basketball, and hockey, which play a relatively large number of
games during their respective playing seasons, may be more justified to use
the 'games played' method as it may be more appropriate due to22the fact that it
is more convenient and produces approximately the same result.
What Can and CannotBe Included in the Apportionment Factor?
In addition to justified rationale of what is a fair method of apportioning
income within a given state, courts have also needed to determine what can
and cannot be included in the apportionment factor. To determine the
apportionment factor, courts have addressed the issue of what actually
qualifies as a season to an athlete. 2 3 Early court rulings concluded that
training camp, exhibition games, and league playoffs, which are required in a
standard player's contract, are to be included in the apportionment factor while
later rulings determined off season training, despite being beneficial for both
the team and the player were not to be included.
The first state court cases to rule on what constitutes a season for an
athlete was In re White. 24 White, an outfielder for the New York Yankees and
a resident of New Jersey during the 1971 and 1972 baseball seasons,
his total number of games
apportioned spring training exhibition games into
25
played within and outside the state of New York.
On February 10, 1979 the court ruled that since White is obligated to
participate in spring training or face consequences, such as breach of contract,
his salary and compensation should take into consideration the exhibition
games, even though he is not paid directly for those games, as White had as
much of a contractual and professional obligation to participate in exhibition

20. Id. at ll.
21. Id.at9.
22. Id.
23. The total number of games in a season represents the denominator in the apportionment
factor for athletes.
24. In re White, 1979 N,Y. Tax Comm'n LEXIS at 535.
25. Id.at1.
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26
games as he did in regular season games.
The state of California has also addressed this issue in Wilson v. Franchise
Tax Board.2 7 Wilson, a resident of the state of Washington and employed by
the Los Angeles Raiders as a quarterback argued that preparation for a NFL
season was a year round event. 28 Wilson used the entire calendar year and
apportioned 153 days to the state of California for an apportionment factor of
41.8% of his income allocated to the state.
California used their own apportionment factor of 144 California working
days, while using a denominator of 162 total days that included additional
non-California football season days when the Raiders and Wilson were
playing road games in other states, therefore apportioning a much higher
29
88.88% of his income to the state of California.
On December 13, 1993 the California Court of Appeals ruled in favor of
the state's apportionment formula stating that, while it was in the player's selfinterest, and the team encouraged him to train year round, his contract did not
require it. 30 Therefore Wilson's off-season training could not be included in
31
the apportionment formula.

What Is Considered Compensation?
The last issue focuses on what constitutes compensation that can be
allocated and taxed. Early state court cases determined that a signing bonus
did not qualify as income earned for services and therefore could not be
apportioned. Later ruling, specifically those in California and Wisconsin,
narrowed the scope of what actually qualified as a true signing bonus, thus
making nearly all signing bonuses income and therefore properly apportioned
to all states in which services were performed.
The first state court case regarding apportioning of a nonresident's signing
bonus as income to that state occurs in New York, Clark v. N. Y. State Tax
Commissioner.32 Clark, a hockey player from the University of New
Hampshire, signed a contract with the Boston Bruins for the 1974-75 NHL
season that included a signing bonus of $20,000. 33 During the fall of 1974
26. Id. at 3.
27. Wilson v. Franchise Tax Bd., 20 Cal. App. 4th 1441, 1448 (Ct. App. 1993. The court follows
and expands on the previous ruling from In re Krake. 1976 Cal. Tax LEXIs 32 (Bd of Equal'n 1976).
28. Wilson, 20 Cal. App. 4th at 1448
29. Id.
30. Id. at 1447.
31. Id. at 1452.
32. Clark v.N.Y. State Tax Comm'n, 86 A.D.2d 691, 691 (Ct. App. 1982).
33. Id. at 691.
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Clark was assigned to the Bruins minor league affiliate in Rochester, New
34
York, where he played the first part of the NHL season.
The issue in the case centered on Clark's signing bonus and his failure to
apportion it to the state of New York. As a nonresident of New York, Clark
apportioned his 1974 salary to New York but did not apportion his signing
35
bonus.
On January 7, 1982 the court ruled that since both Clark and the Boston
Bruins were nonresidents of New York that receipt of the "signing bonus" is
not in connection with the subsequent performance of the contract in New
36
York and it is therefore not to be allocated to the state.
The Clark case is simplistic, and is the only court case regarding a
nonresident's signing bonus apportionment in the state of New York.
However, the issue is addressed three times each in the states of California and
Wisconsin. California first addressed this issue In re Foster. 37
Foster, an outfielder for the Cincinnati Reds and a nonresident of
California during the 1979 tax year, argued that a signing bonus of $400,000
was not attributable to any games played in the state of California and should
not be subject to apportionment. 38 Foster, a resident of Ohio, argued that a
sign-on fee is not compensation for labor or personal services, therefore the
bonus should not be apportioned, and should be taxed only in the state of
residence. 39
The main issue to be decided by the court in Foster was whether the
$400,000 in compensation should be categorized as a signing bonus received
for exclusive signing rights by the team, or as a playing bonus received as
compensation for services performed. 40 On November 14, 1984 the court
ruled that Foster's "playing bonus was plainly distinguishable from that of a
signing bonus in both custom and practice, and the disputed $400,000 portion
of Foster's salary clearly represented compensation for his services and should
41
be apportioned to the state of California."
Following New York and California, Wisconsin's In re Dorsey42 provides
the ruling that all cases since have directly or indirectly followed. Dorsey, a
34. Id.
35. Id.
36. Id. at 692.
37. In re Foster, 1984 Cal. Tax LEXIS 18 (Bd of Equal'n (1984).
38. Id. at 2.
39. Id.; see also In re McAneeley, 1980 Cal. Tax LEXIS 48 (1980).
40. In re Foster, 1984 Cal. Tax LEXIS at 6.
41. Id.; see also In re McAneeley, 1980 Cal. Tax LEXIs 48 (1980).
42. In re Dorsey, 1989 Wis. Tax LEXIS 8 (Tax App. Comm'n 1989).
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Linebacker out of the University of Connecticut, was drafted in the fourth
round of the 1984 NFL draft by the Green Bay Packers. On July 10, 1984 he
signed a three-year contract with the team that included a "signing bonus" that
was to be received at the time of signing the contract. 43 As a resident of
Connecticut and nonresident of Wisconsin, at issue was Dorsey's failure to
44
apportion the signing bonus to the state of Wisconsin.
Dorsey argued that the bonus received was strictly a signing bonus for
which he was required to do nothing more than execute a contract with the
Green Bay Packers. 45 As such, it would not be taxable since it was not in
return for any personal services that he performed within the state. 46 The state
countered that this was not a pure signing bonus since Dorsey was required to
47
do more than just sign his contract in return for the bonus.
On March 17, 1989 the court agreed with the state and ruled that Dorsey's
signing of his contract was just one of several conditions he was required to
meet in order to collect and retain his bonus. 4 8 The court used as justification
the fact that Dorsey's contract stated that his bonus was refundable should he
fail to report or should he leave the team without their consent. 49 The court
then concluded that the signing bonus represented income derived from a
performance of personal services, and therefore represented the compensation
of services that were performed within the state of Wisconsin and should be
apportioned to the state. 50
III. STATE TAXATION OF NONRESIDENT ATHLETES

Despite New York and California taxing of nonresident professional
athletes, this practice received little public attention until the early 1990s. At
that time though, both the state of Illinois and the city of Philadelphia created
national media attention when they began taxing nonresident athletes on their
apportioned income earned inside their respective jurisdictions.
Illinois tax, which began on December 31, 1992, was retaliatory, as it was
implemented in response to lawmakers discovering a similar tax on Michael
Jordan and the Bulls by the state of California following their 1991 NBA
Championship against the Lakers. The law, reciprocal in nature taxed only
43. Id. at 2.
44. Id.

45. Id. at 9.
46. Id.
47. Id. at 10.
48. Id. at 12.
49. Id. at 10.
50. Id. at 14.
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those athletes whose resident state taxed Illinois athletes. 5 1
Philadelphia's tax, on the other hand, was in response to an additional
need for revenue as the city was nearly a quarter-billion dollars in debt and
City Hall had run out of virtually everything, from postage stamps for its
letters to trousers for its police recruits. 52 Philadelphia hoped to increase
revenue by eight million, mailed more than 20,000 tax notices to professional
athletes, assessing taxes as far back as 1986, the last year open under its statute
53
of limitations.
Contrary to Illinois's new tax law, Philadelphia was only enforcing a law
that had already been on their books for decades, as the Pennsylvania
Constitution authorizes' cities and towns to impose a variety of local taxes,
including taxes on earned income. 54 The tax in question, known as the
Philadelphia Wage and Net Profits Tax, was first enacted in 1939 and applied
55
to both residents and nonresidents of Philadelphia.
A Uniform Approach
In June of 1992, in response to the growing number of states either
enacting or enforcing their nonresident tax on professional athletes, the
Federation of Tax Administrators [FTA] formed a task force chaired by James
W. Wetzler. With tax administrators from New York, California, Wisconsin,
Colorado, Iowa, New Jersey, Vermont, Virginia and input from the four major
league players associations, the task force focus was to examine the various
nonresident income tax issues and develop a uniform approach to
appropriately apportioning the income of professional athletes across states for
56
tax purposes.
Until that time, and since then, the task force is the only effort to provide a
uniform approach to the taxation of nonresident professional athletes in
response to the growing number of states looking to increase their tax revenue
by this practice. The task force came up with two general recommendations to
the states. First, states should adopt a uniform formula for apportioning the
income of team members.5 7 Second, states should take affirmative steps to
reduce the return filing and compliance burden facing team members and
51. Hugh Dellios, Legislators OK Jordan'sRevenge, CHI. TRIB., July 1, 1991, at 3.
52. Michael DeCourcy Hinds, PhiladelphiaClimbs out of Fiscal Depths and Builds by Sharing
Sacrifices, N.Y. TIMES, Apr. 6, 1993, at A19.
53. Wetzler, supra note 2.
54. Thomson/RIA 2007 Checkpoint State and Local Taxes 59,285.
55. Thomson/RIA 2007 Checkpoint State and Local Taxes 1 59,287.
56. Wetzler, supra note 2.
57. Id.
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58

sports teams.
The task force believed that the compliance burden facing taxpayers,
teams, and states could be addressed effectively only through a consistent
method of taxation. 59 To provide guidance on this issue, the task force
proposed uniform state regulations in the appendix of the report for states to
apply to professional athletes.60
The task force suggested that states apply a uniform apportionment
formula that can be applied to the athletes and team personnel that travel with
the team. 6 1 Apportionment of income would be under the duty-day formula
and would include the exhibition season as well as any days during the offseason when a team member undertakes training activities as part of a team
62
imposed program, but only if conducted at the facility of the team.
Income to be apportioned by the duty-day formula includes all
compensation paid to a team member for the performance of a required
service. 63 Income not subject to apportionment would include strike benefits,
severance pay, termination pay, contract buyout payments, relocation
payments, and other payments not related to services rendered to the team. 64
Bonuses earned as a result of play during the regular season or for
participation in championship, playoff, or all-star games would be apportioned
under the formula. 65 Signing bonuses would not be subject to apportionment
under the formula if they are not conditional on playing any games for the
team, are payable separately from any other compensation, and are
66
nonrefundable.
The CurrentStatus of NonresidentState Taxation on ProfessionalAthletes
Fifteen years after the FTA task force's recommendation and sixteen years
after the implementation of Philadelphia's city tax and Illinois retaliatory tax,
we now find twenty of the twenty-four states that are home to a professional
sports team in the four major leagues currently enforcing their nonresident

58. Id.
59. Id.
60. Id.
61. Id.
62. Id.; see also Wilson., Cal. App. 4 th at 1441.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. Id.
66. Id.
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state tax laws.
Although states, such as Arizona, New York, and Wisconsin have
completely adopted the FTA's recommendations, and others such as
Massachusetts and Maryland have adopted aspects of the FTA's
recommendations, the majority of states continue to use their own
interpretation of their nonresident state tax laws and how they relate to
professional athletes. Of the twenty states that enforce their tax on nonresident
athletes, twelve fail to use the term professional athlete and duty-day
allocation in their tax codes.
In specifically addressing those states that affect Major League Baseball,
we can focus on the issues which athletes from this league face on an annual
basis. Excluding the District of Columbia and Toronto, Canada, Major
67.
State

No.

Tax

Pro
Teams

NonResidents

CA
FL
NY
TX

15
9
9
8

YES
NO
YES
NO

PA
OH
IL

7
6
5

YES
YES
YES

MO
AZ

5
4

YES
YES

CO
DC

4
4

YES
NO

GA
MA

4
4

YES
YES

MI
MN
WA

4
4
4

YES
YES
NO

NC
TN
WI

3
3
3

YES
NO
YES

IN

2

YES

LA
MD
NJ

2
2
2

YES
YES
YES

UT

1

YES
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League Baseball plays in twenty-eight cities spread out in seventeen different
states. A professional baseball player may be subjected to resident and
nonresident tax in fourteen of these states and is subject to city tax in ten
additional jurisdictions.
The following chart below outlines the seventeen states that affect
professional baseball players, outlining each state's tax rates along with any
additional tax it may be subjected to, as well as a list of reciprocal agreements
68
between the different states.
CHART I
State
Tax Rate

state

Additional
Tax

States with Reciprocal
Agreements

Arizona

Minimum 2.74% on income
under $10,000. Up to 4.79% on
income over $150,000

No

California

California

Minimum
income
under
$6,620. Up1%
to on
9.3%
on income
over $43,467

1.00%over
on taxable
incomes
$1 million

None

Colorado

4.632% Flat Rate

No

None

Florida

0.00%

No

None

Georgia

Minimum 1% on income under
$750. Up to 6% on income
over $7,000

No

None

No
Illinois

3% Flat Rate

Kentucky, Wisconsin,
Michigan, Iowa

Maryland

4.75% on income over $3,000

Nonresidents pay
Additional 1.25% tax

Pennsylvania, Virginia,
West Virginia, the District of
Columbia

Massachusetts

5.3% Flat Rate

No

No tax liability if non-resident's
Income earned in MA is under
$8,000

Michigan

3.9% Flat Rate

1.35% Detroit City Tax

Wisconsin, Indiana, Kentucky,
Illinois, Ohio, Minnesota

Minnesota

Minimum 5.35% on income
under $17,570. Up to 7.85% on
income over $67,360

No

Wisconsin, Michigan, North Dakota

Missouri

Minimum 1.5% on income
under $1,000._Up to_6%_on

_________

68. See Appendix.

1%St. Louis Tax
1% Kansas City Tax
__________________________

None
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income over $9,000

New York

Ohio

Minimum 4% on income under
$16,000. Up to 6.85% on
income over $20,000
Minimum 0.68 1%on income
under $5,000. Up to 6.87% on
income over $200,000

No

None

2.0% Cleveland City Tax
2.1% Cincinnati City Tax

Indiana, Kentucky, Michigan,
Pennsylvania and West Virginia

1.00% Pittsburgh City Tax

New Jersey, Maryland,

Pennsylvania

3.07% Flat Rate

2.801% Philadelphia City
Tax. 3.7716% Non-residents
of Philadelphia

Indiana, Ohio, Virginia,
And West Virginia

Texas

0.00%

No

None

Washington

0.00%

No

None

Wisconsin

Minimum 4.6% on income
under $9,106. Up to 6.75% on
I
income over $137,4100

No

Illinois, Indiana, Kentucky,
Michigan, and Minnesota
Michigan,1andMinnesota

Of the seventeen states in which a professional baseball player may play in
any given year, Florida, Texas and Washington do not have a tax on resident
or nonresident income. Of the remaining fourteen, California subjects its
residents and nonresidents with the highest state tax rate at 9.3% on income
over $43,467 as well as imposing an additional 1% on taxable incomes over
$1 million. The millionaires' tax, which California voters approved on
November 2, 2004, is a 1% surcharge on those with taxable income over $1
million with all revenues generated to provide additional funds for various
mental health programs beginning in January of 2005.69
The imposition of a city tax further complicates matters for professional
athletes in four of the fourteen states that impose individual income tax.
Athletes performing services in Ohio, not only are subjected to a 6.87% state
tax rate on income over $200,000 they also are subjected to city tax in both
Cleveland and Cincinnati, which increases their overall tax rate to nearly
9%.70

Discrepancies in how nonresidents and residents are taxed take place in
two of the jurisdictions. Both Maryland and the city of Philadelphia impose a
higher income tax rate on nonresidents than those who are residents.
71
Maryland adds an additional 1.25% tax to all nonresidents' income.
69. CAL. REv. & TAX. CODE § 17043 (West 2005).
70. 2006 Tax Tables for Form IT-1040 and IT-1040EZ & 59,259 Cleveland Income Tax
Summary - Ohio, Thomson/RIA 2007 & 59,251 Table of Ohio Municipal Income Taxes Ohio,
Thomson/RIA 2007.
71. 2006 Form 505 Instructions-Nonresident Income Tax Returns.
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Philadelphia's income tax rate for nonresidents is 3.7716% in comparison to
an individual resident's tax rate of 2.801%.72
Reciprocal agreements between states to not tax each other's nonresidents
are found in seven of the fourteen states that tax individuals alleviating both
burden and compliance issues for the taxpayers and the collectors. Michigan
and Pennsylvania have entered into six reciprocal agreements with other
states, while Ohio and Wisconsin have agreements with five, Illinois has four
and Maryland has two.
All fourteen states that have residential tax on personal income while
taxing the apportioned income earned by nonresidents within their state also
provide a tax credit for their residents for taxes paid to another state. 73 These
tax credits eliminate the possibility of double taxation on athletes; however, in
all cases they are limited and in most cases do not totally eliminate the
additional taxes paid as a nonresident.
IV. A MACTRO ANALYSIS OF NON-RESIDENT TAX USING MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL

With only California and New York taxing nonresident athletes prior to
the 1990s these two states did not have to concern themselves with other states
taxing their residents. However, with the increase of additional states taxing
nonresident athletes, the supplemental income received by this practice has
been eroded by having to provide tax credits to their own residents. Having in
the previous section outlined the history and the number of states that tax
nonresidents, the question that will now be addressed is whether the taxing of
nonresident athletes is still a revenue producing opportunity for these states?
By looking at the fourteen states outlined in the previous section and using
the payrolls of the thirty Major League Baseball teams, it can be determined
that states in nearly all instances do in fact increase revenue in this process.74
As Chart II illustrates, in spite of having to pay out $19,336,169 in tax credits
to resident athletes, simply by enforcing tax on nonresident personal income
earned within their state, states have increased their tax revenue by
$32,762,444 for a net increase of $13,426,275.

72. PHILADELPHIA, PA CODE §19-1502 (i)(a) & (b) (2006).
73. Wetzler, supra note 2.
74. 2006 MLB Total Payroll, USATODAY.COM, http://content.usatoday.com/sports/baseball/
salaries/totalpayroll.aspx?year-=2006 (last visited Apr. 1i, 2009).
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CHART II
NonHome State

Payroll

Resident

Resident

Tax

Credit

Resident

Tax

Net

Collected

Difference

Ratio

Tax
Illinois

$197,175,166

$5,915,255

$1,436,596

$1,304,657

$5,783,316

-$131,939

0.9777

New York

$295,748,042

$20,258,344

$3,605,578

$3,573,232

$20,225,998

-$32,346

0.9984

Georgia

$90,156,876

$5,409,223

$1,157,901

$1,378,810

$5,630,132

$220,909

1.0408

$336,831

1.0529

Massachusetts

$120,099,824

$6,365,291

$1,281,878

$1,618,709

$6,702,122

Arizona

$59,684,226

$3,006,947

$448,010

$724,736

$3,283,673

$276,726

1.0920

Michigan

$82,612,866

$3,221,902

$498,375

$811,702

$3,535,229

$313,327

1.0972

Wisconsin

$57,568,333

$3,885,313

$792,045

$1,384,658

$4,477,926

$592,613

1.1525

California

$424,114,826

$39,432,035

$3,728,316

$9,401,568

$45,105,287

$5,673,252

1.1439

Pennsylvania

$134,991,083

$4,144,226

$907,245

$1,524,252

$4,761,233

$617,007

1.1489

Ohio

$116,941,019

$8,029,380

$1,597,545

$3,124,534

$9,556,369

$1,526,989

1.1902

Missouri

$136,185,371

$8,170,672

$1,784,328

$3,407,073

$9,793,417

$1,622,745

1.1986

Maryland

$72,585,582

$3,447,763

$729,412

$1,409,360

$4,127,711

$679,948

1.1972

Minnesota

$63,396,006

$4,975,699

$813,539

$1,901,273

$6,063,433

$1,087,734

1.2186

Colorado

$41,233,000

$1,909,088

$555,401

$1,197,880

$2,551,567

$642,479

1.3365

$118,171,138

$19,336,169

$32,762,444

$131,597,413

$13,426,275

1.1136

TOTAL

How Is this Possible?
An increase in nonresident tax revenue to states is directly determined by
one of two factors. States that possess either a higher tax rate or are home to a
team with a low payroll will be more profitable in this practice. By using the
example of California and Colorado it will help further explain how these two
variables help create an increase in revenue.
California's tax revenue increase of $5,673,252 represents 42% of the
overall increase of $13,426,275 and can be explained by the fact that
California has the highest personal income tax rate of 9.3%. As a result, when
California provides a tax credit to their residents for taxes paid to other states
it does not completely erode away the additional tax revenue produced by the
taxing of nonresidents personal income earned in California.
In contrast, Illinois's loss of revenue is due to the fact that, unlike
California's high tax rate, their three percent income tax rate is the lowest rate
of the fourteen states. As a result, Illinois ends up providing a full credit to
residents for taxes paid to other states and therefore completely eliminates any
additional revenue produced by the taxing of nonresidents.
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To further illustrate this point, the following example below shows the
consequences of two athletes who are residents of either California (taxpayer
A) or Illinois (taxpayer B) that equally split their season between the two
states and earn $1,000,000.
Example A
Taxpayer

Residency

Income

CA

IL

CA

IL

CA 'l

IL

Income

Income

Tan.s

To.

Credit

Credit

Tax

A

California

$1,000,000

$1,000,000

$500,000

$90,871

$15,000

S15,000

so

B

Illinois

$1,000,000

$500,000

$1.000,000

$45,436

$30,000

S0

$15.000

California

$136,307

Illinois

(15.000)
$45,000

$15.000)

Total
Revenue

Difference

$121,307

1.33

$30,000

1.00

As the chart shows, each state credits their residents for their income taxes
paid as nonresidents, however since Illinois tax rate of 3% is below that of
California's effective tax rate of over 9%, Illinois maximizes their resident's
tax credits, therefore eliminating any addition tax revenue gained by taxing
taxpayer A's nonresident income.
In contrast California, with an effective tax rate of over 9%, is able to tax
both taxpayer A and B at this rate, while only providing a limited income tax
credit of 3% to taxpayer A's income earned in Illinois, resulting in an increase
in tax revenue of $30,436 or 33% to the state of California.
A state's tax rate is only one factor in whether it will be profitable. The
role a state's home team's payroll must also be taken into consideration.
Colorado's 34% increase in tax revenue represents the greatest return as a
percentage in comparison to the twelve states that showed a profit in taxing
nonresidents. The fact that Colorado is home to the Rockies, which has the
third lowest team payroll for the year in question provides the rationale of why
this occurs. Whereas New York, the home to two of the top five payrolls in
major league baseball with the Yankees and Mets, sees their additional
revenue received from the taxing of nonresident athletes eclipsed by the tax
credits provided to their residents.
To help illustrate this point, the chart below shows the consequences of
two athletes who are residents of either New York (taxpayer A) or Colorado
(taxpayer B) that equally split their season between the two states. The
difference though, is that taxpayer B plays for the Colorado Rockies and earns
$350,000 per year while taxpayer A plays for either the Yankees or Mets and
75. CAL. REV. & TAX § 17041 (h)(l) & (2) calculates California income over $43,467 by
multiplying the amount over $43,467 by .093 and adding $1,913.78 to that amount.
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76
earns 3.59 times that rate.

Example B

Taxpayer

Residency

Income

NY

CO

NY

CO

NY "lox

C) 'ra,

Total/

Income

Income

Tax

Tax

Credit

Credit

Revenue

A

New York

$1,255,205

S1,255,205

$627,603

$85,982

$29,058

$29.05%

s0

B

Colorado

$350,000

$175,000

$350,000

$11,988

$16,205

$0

$8.103

NewYork

$97,613

Colorado

I$29,059)
$45,263

(4S,103)

Difference

$80,899

0.94

$37,160

2.29

In conclusion, the fact that Colorado's home team has one of the lowest
team payrolls offsets the fact that their state income tax rate of 4.63% is lower
than New York's 6.85%. Colorado gains $29,058 in revenue from taxpayer
A's Colorado based income, while in return providing a tax credit to taxpayer
B's nonresident New York income of only $8,103. The result for the state of
Colorado is a net increase in taxable revenue of $20,955 or 129%.
New York, in contrast, increases its tax revenue by only $11,988 in taxing
taxpayer B's New York based income and therefore is unable to cover the
$29,058 tax credit provided to taxpayer A's Colorado nonresident income,
thus causing New York to lose revenue in this scenario as they do in real life.
Finally, it should be noted that states that possess both variables are the
most profitable in this practice, as 75% of the entire increase in revenue
collected as shown in Chart II comes from only four states: California,
Missouri, Ohio, and Minnesota. This is due to the fact that California
(9.23%), Minnesota (7.8%) and Ohio (6.76%) represent three of the four
highest personal income tax rates amongst the fourteen. In addition, all four of
the states possess at least one home team in that state that falls into the bottom
third in payroll. The combination of these two factors makes these four states
highly profitable in the practice of taxing nonresident athletes who come into
their state and perform services.
V. A MICRO ANALYSIS OF NON-RESIDENT TAx USING MAJOR LEAGUE
BASEBALL

In the previous section it was determined that taxing nonresident athletes
is in fact a profitable practice.
This section addresses the practical
76. 2006 MLB Total Payroll, supra note 74. During the 2006 MLB season the average salary for
the Mets ($101,084,963) and Yankees ($194,663,079) was 3.5863 times the average salary for the
Colorado Rockies ($41,233,000). Id.
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implications on those nonresident individuals who are affected. In order to
achieve this, the state and federal tax consequences were studied for individual
professional athletes that perform services in Major League Baseball.
Chart III below shows the results of those individuals on the twenty-eight
teams involved. In order to provide a fair representation it is assumed that
each individual earned $3 million annually, filed as single, and did not miss
any games due to an injury that would have caused them not to travel with the
team. In addition, the only deductions that were taken on Schedule A of the
federal return were state taxes paid during the year.
CHART III
State

Non-Res

Tax

Tax

Rate

Rate

Rate

FL

35.73%

0.00%

1.66%

so

$0

$49,835

$49,835

$1,072,031

$49,835

$1,878,134

TX

35.68%

0.00%

1.86%

$0

$0

$55,857

$55,857

$1,070,295

$55,857

$1,873,848

TX

35.67%

0.00%

1.88%

$0

$0

$56,320

$56,320

$1,070,069

$56,320

$1,873,611

FL

35.72%

0.00%

1.90%

$0

$0

$57,097

$57,097

$1,071,452

$57,097

$1,871,451

WA

35.60%

0.00%

2.26%

$0

$0

$67,682

$67,682

$1,067,963

$67,682

$1,864,355

IL

35.24%

3.00%

1.04%

$89,940

-$22,504 $53,752

$31,248

$1,057,314

$121,188

$1,821,498

L

35.18%

3.00%

1.13%

$89,940

-$21,003 $54,905

$33,902

$1,055,539

$123,842

$1,820,619

MI

34.37%

3.87%

113%

$116,015 -$18,085 $52,104

$34,019

$1,031,103

$150,034

$1,818,863

PA

35.06%

3.07%

1.59%

$92,100

-$26,763 $74,503

$47,740

$1,051,756

$139,840

$1,808,404

MD

34.93%

4.74%

0.46%

$142,239 -$29,603 $43,525

$13,922

$1,047,986

$156,161

$1,795,853

$1,041,311

$166,893

$1,791,796

State

Resident
Non-Reidnt.
Tax
Tax

Tampa Bay Rays
Texas Rangers
Houston Astros
Florida Marlins
Seattle Mariners
Chicago Cubs
Chic. White Sox
Detroit Tigers
Pittsburgh Pirates
Baltimore Orioles
Colorado Rockies
Phil. Phillies
Boston Red Sox
AZ Diamondbacks
Atlanta Braves
K.C. Royals
St. Louis Cardinals
Mil. Brewers
N.Y. Yankees
New York Mets
Cleveland Indians
Cincinnati Reds
Minnesota Twins

ActuaW

Federal
Tax

State
Team

Non-Res
Tax

.
Federal Tax
Tax

State

Take
Home

Tax

Credit

CO

34.71%

4.62%

0.94%

$138,611

-$39,340 $67,622

$28,282

PA

34.81%

3.07%

2.40%

$92,100

-$21,833 $93,776

$71,943

$1,044,252

$164,043

$1,791,705

MA

34.77%

5.29%

0.33%

$158,690 -$35,023 $44,817

$9,794

$1,043,021

$168,484

$1,788,495

AZ

34.55%

4.56%

1.47%

$136,720 -$20,024 $63,958

$43,934

$1,036,503

$180,654

$1,782,843

GA

34.64%

5.81%

0.22%

$174,439 -$43,861 $50,580

$6,719

$1,039,238

$181,158

$1,779,604

MO

34.32%

5.86%

0.90%

$175,823 -$41,120 $68,122

$27,002

$1,029,711

$202,825

$1,767,464

MO

3432%

5.86%

0.96%

$175,737 -$39,547 $68,441

$28,894

$1,029,724

$204,631

$1,765,645

WI

34.22%

6.73%

0.24%

$201,903 -$43,404 $50,595

$7,191

$1,026,548

$209,094

$1,764,358

NY

34.15%

6.83%

0.24%

$204,986 -$36,315 $43,436

$7,121

$1,024,528

$212,107

$1,763,365

NY

34.12%

6.83%

0.33%

$204,986 -$37,576 $47,616

$10,040

$1,023,503

$215,026

$1,761,471

OH

33.94%

6.76%

1.00%

$202,783 -$49,465 $79,565

$30,100

$1,018,223

$232,883

$1,748,894

OH

33.92%

6.76%

1.09%

$202,783 -$46,621 $79,297

$32,676

$1,017,643

$235,459

$1,746,898

MN

33.84%

7.80%

0.25%

$234,122 -$48,358 $55,861

$7,503

$1,015,162

$241,625

$1,743,213

2009]

IMPORTANCE OF CPA vs. ERA
$279,745

$1,705,455

S.F. Giants

CA

33.83%

9.22%

0.11%

$276,554 -$24,277 $27,468

$3,191

$1,014,800

Oakland Athletics

CA

33.87%

9.22%

0.07%

$276,554 -$28,409 S30,412

$2,003

$1,016,075

$278,557

S1,705,368
$1,705,083

CA

33.84%

9.22%

0.11%

S276,554 -$26,739 $30,009

$3,270

$1,015,093

$279,824

L.A. Dodgers

CA

33.86%

9.22%

0.11%

$276,554 -$29,002 $32,372

$3,370

$1,015,654

$279,924

$1,704,422

San Diego Padres

CA

33.86%

9.22%

0.11%

$276,554 -$24,660 $28,015

$3,355

$1,015,919

$279,909

$1,704,172

L.A. Angels

The Results
The practice of taxing nonresident athletes has four effects on those
individuals in which it targets. First, it increases the overall tax burden on the
athlete. Second, athletes based in states with no personal income tax pay the
greatest share of nonresident tax, yet are taxed the least overall. Third,
athletes performing services in cities that also tax nonresidents receive no
credit for these taxes and therefore bare a greater burden of nonresident taxes.
Fourth, those athletes who perform services in states that have the highest
income tax rates are taxed the greatest.
Nonresident taxation increases the tax burden for each individual athlete
by $27,644.32 or .92% in the above chart. Of the $774,041 in additional
nonresident tax paid by athletes, a disproportioned 37.05% is paid by Florida,
Texas and Washington resident athletes. On average, individuals in these
states are taxed $57,358.20. This is due to the fact that these states do not
offer a tax credit against their individual state income tax since they do not
subject their residents to one.
The second result is that athlete employed in states that do not have
individual tax on personal income, such as Florida, Texas and Washington, are
taxed far less than those individuals whose home states do tax personal
income. In spite of the fact that athletes from these states are subjected to the
highest percentage of nonresident state tax paid to other states, they take home
on average $107,694.50, or 6.1% more than those athletes in states that impose
a tax on personal income.
The third result is that although individuals on all twenty-eight teams
studied are affected by city tax, athletes performing services for teams based in
those cities have a greater tax burden than those who are not. On average,
individuals in these cities after tax credits are taxed $38,910.57 or 40.75%
more than those individuals who are not based in these cities. Individuals
performing services for the Philadelphia Phillies have the greatest exposure to
city tax. Playing in a state that has one of the lowest state tax rates of 3.07%
these individuals are subjected to Philadelphia's city tax, which in this incident
represents $47,910, or 66.59% of their actual non-resident tax paid out.
The final result is that individuals exposed to the highest resident tax rate
are taxed the greatest amount. Individuals performing services in California,
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New York, Ohio, Minnesota and Wisconsin on average took home only
$1,732,063.55 or 57.74% of their total income in comparison to the 58.82% of
all individuals or the 62.41% those that played in a state with no income tax
took home. Therefore, on average an individual playing in these five states
received $140,216.25 less after taxes than those athletes who played in
Florida, Texas, or Washington.
An interesting consequence to these high state tax rates is that since both
state and city tax paid is deductible against federal income, those individuals
that are subjected to high individual state taxes are able to lower their federal
tax rate with these deductions. As a result, individuals whose home state is in
California, Minnesota, Ohio, New York, and Wisconsin have the lowest
federal tax rate on their income due to their state tax deductions declared on
schedule A of their federal return.
The end result is that despite their exposure to nonresident state tax, and
their higher federal tax, athletes who reside in states with no state income tax
keep a greater percentage of their overall salary. Therefore resulting in a
player that performed services for the Tampa Bay Rays actually taking home
$173,962 or 10% more than a player who performed services for the San
Diego Padres during the 2006 baseball season.
VI. CONCLUSION
The Supreme Court has established that both the taxing of a nonresident's
income to that state, as well as, the inclusion of a nonresident's income to a
resident state are both constitutional. Therefore, with states looking for
additional ways to increase tax revenue, taxing nonresident's income is a
potential option. Since athletes are an easy target, due to their high profile and
income, states continue to target this population. The two questions this paper
examined are first, with so many states adopting this practice is it still
profitable for states to tax this population, and second, what are the practical
results to those athletes that are affected by this tax?
Using the example of baseball it is revealed that twelve of the fourteen
states that impose a nonresident income tax do profit by taxing this population.
Two factors account for the additional revenue created by the taxing on
nonresident athletes. The first factor depends on the state's personal income
tax rate with higher individual tax rates generating a greater amount of
revenue. The second factor relies on the home state team's payroll, as the
lower the payroll the greater the percentage of return for the state.
Coincidently, states that possess both a high personal income tax rate on
individuals, as well as being home to a team with a low payroll will be the
most profitable in this practice.
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In reviewing the practical application to this practice on the athletes
themselves it is found that although all athletes are exposed to a greater tax
burden, there are three levels which cause the amount of exposure to fluctuate.
First, athletes performing services within a state with no individual income tax
generate the greatest amount of nonresident revenue, yet overall remain taxed
the least. Second, athletes who perform services in a state that in addition
includes a city tax are taxed by two separate jurisdictions without, in most
cases receiving any state credit and therefore are taxed more. Third,
individuals who perform services in a state with a high individual income tax
rate pay lower federal tax, yet still wind up with the greatest tax burden of all
athletes.
Finally, it is important for those individuals who represent these athletes to
understand the potential tax consequences that their clients face.
Understanding state residency issues, as well as tax rates and reciprocal
agreements will limit the liability that has been exposed to their clients. In the
end, the money you save your client is equal to the additional money you have
generated for them.
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State

Arizona

Non-resident
Tax Credits for
Allocation of Income
Taxes Paid to
Other State
Arizona Rev. Stat. Arizona Rev. Stat. Ariz. Admin. Code R52C-604
Ann. § 43-1071
Ann. §43-1011 (3)
(A) (l), (2) & (3)
(a) & (b)
Tax Rate

Reciprocal
Agreements

Court Cases

California

No

California

Cal. Rev. & Tax
Cd. § 17041

Cal. Rev. & Tax
Cd. §18001 (a)

Cal. Rev. & Tax Cd.
17951-5

None

Krake (1976), Partee (1976),
McAneeley (1980), Foster (1984),
Carroll (1987), Testaverde (1995),
Jones (2003), Klee (2008)

Colorado

Colo. Rev. State.
§39-22-104 (1.7)

Colo. Rev. State.
§39-22-108 (1)

Colo. Rev. State. § 3922-109

None

No

Florida

None

None

None

None

No

Georgia

Ga. Code Ann. §
48-7-20 (b) (1)

GA Comp. R. &
Regs. 560-7-7-.01
(1)

GA code Ann. § 48-7-30
(b)

None

No

Illinois

ILCS Chapter 35
§5/201 (b)

ILCS Chapter 35
§5/601 (b)(3)

ILCS §5/304 subsection
(a) (2) (B) (iv) (a)

Ill. Admin. Code
100.7090 Reciprocal
Agreement (IITA
Section 701)

"John and Angela Doe" (2001)

Maryland

Md. Code Ann.
Tax-Gen. § 10105(a)(4)(v)

Md. Code Ann.
Tax-Gen. § 10703(a)

Maryland
Administrative Release
No. 24, 08/31/2000

Maryland Administrative
Release No. 3,
08/31/2003

No

Massachusetts

Mass. Regs. Code
62 §4(b)

Mass. Regs. Code
62 §6 (a)

Mass. Regs. Code
62.5A.2 (2)

Mass. Regs. Code
62.5A.2 (7)

No

Michigan

The Michigan
Income Tax Act,
MCL §206.5 1e

Michigan's Income Tax
Act, MCL 206.256(3),

No

Minnesota

Minnesota Stat.
§290.06 Subd.
2c(a) (1-3)

Minnesota Stat.
§290.06 Subd. 22

Minnesota Stat. §290.17
Subd. 2(a)(2)

Minnesota Stat.
§290.081 (a)

No

Missouri

Mo. Rev. Stat. §
143.011

Mo. Rev. Stat. §
143.081(l)

Mo. Rev. Stat. §
143.183(l)(2)

None

No

New York

NY Tax Law
§601(c)

N.Y. Tax Law
§620(a)

NYCRR 132.22 (a) (I)

None

White (1979), Jabbar (1982),
Clark (1982), Richardson (1984),
Bickett (1996)

Ohio

2006 Tax Tables
for Form IT-1040
and IT-1040EZ

Ohio Rev. Code
Ann. §5747.05

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
5747.20

Ohio Rev. Code Ann. §
5747.05

Hume (1990 & 1991)

Pennsylvania

Pa.Stat. Ann. §
7302 (a)

PA Code 61
§111.3

Texas

None

None

None

None

No

Washington

None

None

None

None

No

Wis. Stat. § 71.06
(1p) (a,b,c,d)

Wis. Stat. § 71.07

Wis. Admin. Code Tax
2.39

Wis. Stat. § 71.05 (2)

Dorsey (1989), Kern et al. (1991
& 1992), Flynn (1994), Dishman
(2005)

Wisconsin

1_

The Michigan Income
The Michigan
Income Tax Act, Tax Act, MCL §206.110
Michigan Revenue
MCL §206.255 (1)
Administative Bulletin
No. 1988-48 9/27/1988

PA Stat. Ann. 72 § 7302 Pa.Stat. Ann. § 7356 (b)
(b)

1

No

